La présente étude entend tracer et analyser le déploiement de « la Vérité de l’Etre » afin de montrer en quoi celui-ci est indissociable, pour Heidegger, de ce qu’il appelle, dans un passage tardif des Cahiers Noirs, l’« auto-annihilation ( Selbstvernichtung ) » du judaïsme. Nous montrerons en quoi et pourquoi, chez Heidegger, l’« Histoire » de la « Vérité de l’Etre », en se déployant elle-même, produit aussi un antijudaïsme, indissociable d’un antisémitisme, sans précédent dans l’histoire de la philosophie (...) occidentale. En effet, le judaïsme, pour Heidegger, se voit brutalement exproprié de toute possibilité d’être, et, par conséquent, demeure résolument forclos de l’« Histoire » gréco-allemande de la « Vérité de l’Etre » pour ne séjourner que dans l’« inessentielle » machination et exploitation « indéterminée » du monde. Il nous appartiendra de souligner, depuis le « dispositif » heideggérien de la « Vérité de l’Etre » – un dispositif, contrairement à ce qu’en dit Heidegger, dès plus technique – en quoi le judaïsme se voit condamné à son « auto-annihilation ». C’est ainsi que l’antijudaïsme de Heidegger, inséparable d’un antisémitisme catégorique, est à comprendre depuis sa pensée philosophique elle-même. Ce qui exige de nous une relecture dès plus vigilante, dès plus intransigeante et un questionnement critique circonstancié de cette œuvre et du rapport qu’elle détermine entre l’« Histoire » de la « Vérité de l’Etre » et l’« auto-annihilation » du judaïsme. Ainsi, à aucun moment ne s’agira-t-il, pour nous, de rejeter purement et simplement la pensée philosophique de Heidegger. Car, c’est aussi par une relecture critique de cette même pensée, par une confrontation incessante envers ce qui s’y cache dans ses plis les plus obscurs et douteux, que peuvent aussi se révéler d’inédites possibilités de repenser notre tradition philosophique tout entière en l’ouvrant vers une tout autre histoire de la philosophie – tout autre que celle qui se sera consacrée et déterminée dans et par le « dispositif » heideggérien. (shrink)

From what standpoint have the canonical philosophies of history looked at death? And, more particularly, at life and death, since these two “events” are intimately linked? According to what idea, n...

Textes issus d'un colloque consacré aux relations entre J. Derrida, son oeuvre, sa pensée et les judéités dans leur pluralité interprétative, linguistique, nationale, politique, philosophique, littéraire et religieuse.

The present context in Europe and in the West, as well as in many parts of the world, is marked by a devastating attack on the Humanities and, by extension, on the ideal of the university. These assaults are visible and manifest in numerous European countries today and their implications are also palpable in France. We shall begin by examining the nature of The present context in Europe and in the West, as well as in these attacks, as well as (...) how and why they afect the ideal of the university to the point of provoking an unparalleled devaluation, perhaps even a negation, of critical discourse. Although we will also and in a certain way engage in what we could call – after Derrida – a “deconstruction of critique”, our aim will always be to inspire and thus ofer a novel future for critical theory. (shrink)

The volume addresses these questions, contrasting Derrida's thought with philosophical predecessors such as Rosenzweig, Levinas, Celan, and Scholem, and tracing ...

Abstract The idea of ?election? cannot be approached, it seems, through traditional or classical philosophical conceptuality. This idea requires another type of discourse. Not simply because this idea refers to an entirely other body of texts, that of the Biblical tradition, but more radically since it commands another modality of thought which must at once suspend and pursue philosophical concepts to the point where they express themselves otherwise than according to the rationality of their own deployment. In truth, the idea (...) of ?election? calls thus for a redefinition of the rapport between singularity and universality, one no longer structured and circumscribed by ?truth?, but rather inspired by a novel and irreducible modality of ?justice?. A ?justice? which opens to the possibility for an ?ethics?, not as ?communicative dialogue?, ?mutual recognition? or a series of established and rationally grounded laws, but a ?place? of incessant and irresolute, non-intentional and unconditional exposition to the Other. (shrink)

This book, focusing on the relationship between Derrida and Levinas and the unresolved tension between these two philosophical corpuses, will show what can yet come to democracy and will consequently offer possible interpretations of that which can occur and happen to us politically.

We should not understand in this title "What does not return to the same" the announcement of a return to Levinas, but rather of what the word or concept of "return" could mean in Levinas's work. There is perhaps no better way of misunderstanding Levinas than imposing on his philosophical gesture the interpretative grid of a "horizon of return". This article will attempt to dismantle the strategies of reading which stipulate that Levinas's philosophy is one of "return". In this way (...) we shall reveal the complexity of Levinasian thought, and that, beyond the numerous slogans, there are the ones of a "return" or of its simple contrary, the ones of a "philosophy of exile". (shrink)

Nous avons voulu exposé, à partir du dernier texte de Fichte intitulé « L’Initiation à la Vie Bienheureuse », ce qu’il conviendrait d’appeler la question de I’humanisme. « Quel est I’être de I’humanisme? » est ainsi la question directrice qui a accompagnée notre lecture du texte de 1812. Nous avons tenté d’indiquer à la fois la racine chrétienne et I’origine philosophico-rationnelle de cet humanisme, en y relevant d’une part les allusions à Saint Jean et en soulevant la notion centrale du (...) sacrifice, tout en maintenant la référence constante à la mouvance et à l’exigence scientifique du philosopher. En contre-poids à cette définition christiano-philosophique de I’humanisme, il nous a semblé necessaire de faire intervenir Lévinas, qui s’efforce de reformuler, ou de réinventer, face à cette tradition philosophique, la question de I’humanisme. Cette reformulation, cette réinvention, s’inscrivant manifestement dans la tradition hébraïque, tâche d’offrir une alternative à la logique sacrificielle de I’humanisme fichtéen, en orientant I’humain non plus vers sa « destination suprême en tant qu’humain » mais vers son « éveil - sans-destination, sans-vocation - à la responsabilité pour Autrui ».We wish to expose,from Fichte’s last text entitled “The way towards the blessed life”, what should be called the question of humanism. “What is the essence of humanism?” is thus the main question that guided our reading of the text from 1812. We have attempted to point out the Christian roots as weIl as the philosophical-rational origin of this humanism by gathering references to Saint John, and by raisingthe central notion of sacrifice, while constantly alluding to the mobility and the scientific exigency of the act of philosophizing. In order to counterbalance this Christian-philosophic definition of humanism, in seemed necessary to us to call in Levinas, who endeavours to reformulate, or to reinvent, in the face of this philosophical tradition, the question of humanism. This reformulation, this reinvention, manifestly in line with Hebraic tradition, seeks to offer an alternative to the sacrificial logic of the Fichtean humanism by orienting Humans no longer towards their “supreme destination qua Humans”, but towards their “awakening - with no destination, no calling - to the responsibility for the Other”. (shrink)

In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.In 2014, Belgium Became the first country in the world to allow euthanasia of minors, irrespective of their age. This article explores whether this legislation enhances minors' rights or negates them.Do minors have capacity for agency? Are they able to make decisions concerning life and death? Can minors understand (...) death? Are minors capable of weighing various alternatives for treatment? Is there a difference between adult euthanasia and child euthanasia? Does life experience matter?... (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to reflect on the Millian, utilitarian argument from truth that is held as one of the most conspicuous answers to the question Why tolerate? This argument postulates that only in a free market of ideas may the truth be discovered. Even the most unpopular idea may contain some truth in it and may contribute to the advancement of knowledge. It further commands us to contest those opinions which are believed to be true vigorously and (...) earnestly to explore some further truth, and to acknowledge their false aspects. The results of free exchange of opinions will either confirm our idea, or bring some doubt to our attention, to cast accounts and maybe change our opinion, at least to some extent. After reflecting on some of the common arguments that are frequently mentioned in this connection, I discuss Mill's formulation of the Truth Principle as it came into expression in his writings. Here I reflect on his article "Law of Libel and Liberty of the Press" which did not receive adequate attention by scholars. I show that it is difficult to reconcile what Mill had to say in this article with what he later said in On Liberty. I further maintain that the Millian view of truth as superior to all other social values might endanger the very ground which the Truth Principle is intended to safeguard, i.e., tolerance. The holding of truth as the most important value might result in harming individuals, and in generating an atmosphere of intolerance. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to ponder the intricate issue of the right to die in dignity by focusing attention on the role of the patient's beloved people. I first provide critical examination of some of the arguments advanced by Ronald Dworkin. I proceed by contemplating relevant scenarios and examining three American court decisions: Saikewicz, Spring and Gray. The first case, Saikewicz, concerns a patient who had no family or other beloved people. I observe that this fact had a (...) significant bearing on the court's ruling not to provide him treatment. The second case, Spring, involves a patient whose family wanted to withhold treatment from him. I argue that we should be cautious of incidents in which the best interests of the patient's beloved people come at the expense of the best interests of the patient. Spring is an example of such a case. The third case, Gray, serves as an example whereby the best interests of the patient coincide with the best interests of her beloved people. I conclude by arguing that attention has to be given to the question of whether the patient's close-ones demonstrate a unified position in regard to the destiny of the patient. Gegenstand des Beitrags ist es, das schwierige Problem des Rechts, in Würde zu sterben, im Hinblick auf die Rolle der Personen zu überdenken, die dem Patienten nahestehen. Der Autor setzt sich zunächst kritisch mit einigen von Ronald Dworkin vorgetragenen Argumenten auseinander. Dann stellt er die relevanten Fallgestaltungen dar und untersucht drei Entscheidungen amerikanischer Gerichte: die Fälle Saikewicz, Spring und Gray. Der erste Fall, Saikewicz, betrifft einen Patienten ohne Familie oder andere ihm nahestehende Personen. Dieser Umstand hatte einen wesentlichen Einfluß auf die Entscheidung des Gerichts, von der Anordnung einer Behandlung des Patienten abzusehen. Im zweiten Fall, Spring, wünschte die Familie, daß der Patient nicht behandelt würde. Der Autor mahnt für alle die Fälle zur Vorsicht, bei denen die Umstände so beschaffen sind, daß das wohlverstandene Interesse der Angehörigen und das des Patienten kollidieren. Der Fall Spring ist ein Beispiel für eine solche Kollisionssituation. Der dritte Fall, Gray, dient als ein Beispiel, in dem sich das wohlverstandene Interesse des Patienten und das der ihm nahestehenden Personen decken. Zuletzt geht es um die Frage, ob die Angehörigen und andere dem Patienten nahestehende Personen in ihren Vorstellungen über das weitere Schicksal des Patienten übereinstimmen oder nicht. Die Frage verdient eine besondere Aufmerksamkeit. (shrink)

The article deals with the Dawson College Massacre, focusing on the story of Kimveer Gill, a 25-year-old man from Laval, Montreal who wished to murder young students in Dawson College. It is argued that the international community should continue working together to devise rules for monitoring specific Internet sites, as human lives are at stake. Preemptive measures could prevent the translation of murderous thoughts into murderous actions. Designated monitoring mechanisms of certain websites that promote violence and seek legitimacy as well (...) as adherents to the actualization of murderous thoughts and hateful messages have a potential of preventing such unfortunate events. Our intention is to draw the attention of the multifaceted international community to the shared interest and need in developing monitoring schemes for certain websites, in order to prevent hideous crimes. (shrink)

This article utilizes Aristotelian and Kantian philosophies to probe the social responsibilities of internet intermediaries that in one way or another assist and promote suicide. Striking a balance...

Are small and large numbers represented similarly or differently on the mental number line? The size effect was used to argue that numbers are represented differently. However, recently it has been argued that the size effect is due to the comparison task and is not derived from the mental number line per se. Namely, it is due to the way that the mental number line is mapped onto the task-relevant output component. Here synesthesia was used to disentangle these two alternatives. (...) In two naming experiments a digit-color synesthete showed that the congruity effect was modulated by number size. These results support the existence of a mental number line with a vaguer numerical representation as numbers increase in size. In addition, the results show that in digit-color synesthesia, colors can evoke numerical representation automatically. (shrink)

This paper addresses the concepts of moral and social responsibility on the Internet in considering the most troubling phenomenon of cyberbullying that results in loss of life. Specifically, I probe the moral and social responsibilities of Internet users (agents), of the education system in fighting cyberbullying, and of Internet intermediaries. Balance needs to be struck between freedom of expression and social responsibility. The tragic story of Megan Meier serves as an illustrative example and some further incidents in which this ugly (...) phenomenon of cyberbullying had cost young life are mentioned. It is argued that all relevant stakeholders need to think of the consequences of their conduct, that Internet abusers should be accountable for their wrongdoing, and that people who have the ability to stop or at least reduce the risk of cyberbullying should take proactive steps, exhibiting zero tolerance to cyberbullying. (shrink)

The Dutch experience has influenced the debate on euthanasia and death with dignity around the globe, especially with regard to whether physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia should be legitimized or legalized. Review of the literature reveals complex and often contradictory views about the Dutch experience. Some claim that the Netherlands offers a model for the world to follow; others believe that the Netherlands represents danger, rather than promise, and that the Dutch experience is the definitive answer regarding why we should not (...) make active euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide part of our lives.Having investigated the Dutch experience for a number of years, in the summer of 1999 I went to the Netherlands to visit the major centers of medical ethics as well as some research hospitals, and to speak with leading figures in euthanasia policy and practice. This essay commences by providing some background information on the practice of euthanasia and on the legal framework, and then reports the main answers to my first question: Why the Netherlands? (shrink)

The Dutch experience has influenced the debate on euthanasia and death with dignity around the globe, especially with regard to whether physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia should be legitimized or legalized. Review of the literature reveals complex and often contradictory views about this experience. Some claim the Netherlands offers a model for the world to follow; others believe the Netherlands represents danger rather than promise, that the Dutch experience is the definitive answer to why we should not make active euthanasia and (...) physician-assisted suicide part of our lives.Given these contradictory views, fieldwork is essential to develop a fully informed opinion. Having investigated the Dutch experience for a number of years, in the summer of 1999 I went to the Netherlands to visit the major centres of medical ethics as well as some research hospitals, and to speak with leading figures in euthanasia policy and practice. This essay reports some of the main findings of my interviews and provides detailed accounts of the way in which some of the Netherlands’ leading experts perceive the policy and practice of euthanasia in their country. These accounts are quite fascinating.The discussion begins with background information on the guidelines for euthanasia. Next, explanation about the research methodology is outlined and then I discuss the interviewees’ views about the guidelines for euthanasia. I conclude by indicating that the Dutch guidelines on the policy and practice of euthanasia do not provide ample mechanisms against abuse. Virtually every guideline has been breached or violated. This finding reiterates Hendin’s finding. I recommend that the Netherlands amend its policy and remedy its troubling practice. (shrink)

The article discusses the way people wish to die, analyzing the legal situation in countries that permit either euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide. While criticizing the Dutch, Belgian and Swiss models, I argue that the Oregon model is the one with apparently little abuse. Building on the experiences of Oregon, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and the Northern Territory of Australia, the article ends with a set of guidelines to improve the conduct of PAS.

This is an extensive critical review of Euthanasia in International and Comparative Perspective. My Review is divided into five parts. First, I outline the book's strengths. I proceed by speaking of the need for clear and cohesive terminology. I then discuss end-of-life decision-making in some of the countries: Belgium, The Netherlands, and the State of Oregon in the United States, all allow PAS. Belgium and The Netherlands also allow euthanasia. I also discuss Israel's Dying Patient Law,13 enacted by the Knesset (...) on December 5, 2005. Finally, I make some suggestions for improvement, including a detailed proposal for PAS which I conceive to be the best policy when balancing one against the other the autonomy of the patient, on the one hand, and the safeguards against abuse when life might be considered too lightly, on the other. Indeed, the main difference between euthanasia and PAS is that in euthanasia, it is the physician who makes the final act of taking patient's life, whereas in PAS it is the patient who takes his or her life. In euthanasia, the physician has control over the process. In PAS, the physician controls the procedure up until the last act. The patient has control over the very act of suicide. (shrink)

The aim is to review the decisions of the Central Elections Committee and of the Supreme Court regarding disqualification of lists in Israel. Two major questions are addressed: When should tolerance have its limits?; and, What constraints on liberty should be introduced in order to safeguard democracy? The judicial analysis focuses attention on the issue of whether the justices acted in accordance with the law. Consideration is given to the written law and to existing normative considerations which allow justices an (...) exegetic latitude. It is argued that theNeiman decision of 1984 was flawed, that the Court was erroneous in ignoring the licensing effect of its decision, and that democracy does not have to allow a violent list propounding the destruction of democracy to act in order to fulfil its aim. It is neither morally obligatory, nor morally coherent, to expect democracy to place the means for its own destruction in the hands of those who either wish to bring about the physical annihilation of the state, or to undermine democracy. These two cases are the only cases in which democracy has to introduce self-defensive measures and to deny representation in parliament to violent lists that convey such ideas, and that act to realize them. (shrink)

Neurosurgery for psychiatric disorders, also sometimes referred to as psychosurgery, is rapidly evolving, with new techniques and indications being investigated actively. Many within the field have suggested that some form of guidelines or regulations are needed to help ensure that a promising field develops safely. Multiple countries have enacted specific laws regulating NPD. This article reviews NPD-specific laws drawn from North and South America, Asia and Europe, in order to identify the typical form and contents of these laws and to (...) set the groundwork for the design of an optimal regulation for the field. Key challenges for this design that are revealed by the review are how to define the scope of the law, what types of regulations are required, and how to approach international harmonization given the potential migration of researchers and patients. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Cynthia B. Cohen THE TRIALS OF SOCRATES AND JOSEPH K. No two trials could have been more unlike than those of Socrates and Joseph K. As portrayed in Plato's Apology,' Socrates was the conscience of Athens, a thoughtful and courageous man whose life was devoted to the pursuit of wisdom. He challenged others to examine themselves and to transform themselves into lovers of truth and goodness. (...) This gadfly of Athens was put on trial by those whom he had stung and was dispatched with a final slap. He died the bravest, wisest, and most upright man of his time. By contrast, Joseph K., the protagonist of Kafka's novel, The Trial, was an ordinary bank clerk locked into a life of unreflective routine. His arrest one day by the agents of a Court he could not comprehend failed to change his rote approach. Like a fly stuck fast to flypaper, he was glued to the details of his immediate experience, and would not rise above these to find meaning in his dreary life, or even in his shameful death. Socrates was an original and constructive thinker who died rather than deny the purpose that he found in human life; Joseph K. was a leaden bureaucrat whose life was one long moment of guilty hesitation before a broader vision of things. Or is it that Socrates was an arrogant, peculiar, conniving failure who was engaged in an insidious attempt to undermine the moral and political values of Athens? And is it that Joseph K. was a successful young businessman who had established himself as a conscientious, decent, and eminently reasonable man struggling bravely for justice against an alien and capricious authority? Or perhaps these two trials should be seen as very similar. Each man was tried on charges of which he claimed to be innocent; each wanted to restore order and meaning to a disintegrating world; each led a life that became the cause of his death; and each was condemned for claiming that the unexamined life was not worth living. Or is it that Joseph K. was condemned for maintaining that it was the examined life that was not worth living...? 212 Cynthia B. Cohen213 Difficulties in the interpretation of works of literature are to be expected when their subjects are complex and subtle individuals set in an atmosphere in which basic questions of human significance are raised. Both the Apology and The Trial are such works. Socrates initially seems a model of clarity to the interpreter. He responds to his accusers in a form of direct discourse that can be taken at face value. He presents his arguments openly and cogently. There can be no doubt that his general position is coherent, consistent, and reasonable. Yet the interpreter 's initial satisfaction fades as Socrates' irony creates confusion about what Socrates professes to know. His lines of reasoning seem to intersect in paradox; his answers to questions about the meaning and purpose of human life curve around to miss each other. The interpreter emerges confused and perplexed. These transformations of perspective and significance are repeated in The Trial. Joseph K., too, is described in a straightforward manner that is clear and quite detailed. His reactions and arguments appear sensible and well-reasoned. Yet on closer examination, his simple statements turn out to have hidden meanings; his responses often contradict one another; his logical arguments appear pointless. His answers to questions about the meaning and purpose of human life are immediately challenged by a horde of competitors. To the interpreter, The Trial metamorphizes into a model of intentional obscurity. The problem of interpretation is compounded in the case of Socrates by the question of the accuracy of our information about him. The "Socratic problem" is well known. Each of the four major sources about his life and thought, Xenophon, Aristophanes, Plato, and Aristotle, presents a somewhat different person. There has been strong support for the view that the portrayal of Socrates in the earlier dialogues of Plato is essentially sound, even though this earlier Socrates seems at variance with the later one. The resolution of this problem is irrelevant to this endeavor. Our purpose is to consider the life and... (shrink)

This volume is part one of a two-volume set. It may be purchased separately or in conjunction with volume two. A reprint of the 1969 Oxford University Press edition. Volume I: Hobbes—Gay: Thomas Hobbes, Richard Cumberland, Ralph Cudworth, John Locke, Lord Shaftesbury, Samuel Clarke, Bernard Mandeville, William Wollaston, Francis Hutcheson, Joseph Butler, John Balguy, John Gay.

Besides commanding coercive power, a political authority is supposed to offer directives which ought to exclude private judgment. Any defense of inalienable rights or limited rights of resistance suggests some legitimate residual private judgment. Such retained rights threaten to undermine the binding force of authoritative directives. ;The case of Hobbesian sovereignty typifies this problem. Hobbes claims agents must establish permanent and absolute political authorities, and they can do so only by completely submitting themselves to a sovereign power whose public will (...) stand for their own. Hobbesian political obligation consists in being bound not to act on one's own judgment, but even Hobbes allows for limited rights of resistance. ;Building on the work of Joseph Raz, I show how political authority binds our conduct by providing special reasons not to act on our private judgment. I explain how there can be scope and jurisdictional limitations on political authority, indeed, Hobbesian political authority. Any given subject might not completely authorize political power, but such power can still be absolute. Since private judgment endures in a civil society, subjects are in some position to evaluate the legitimacy of authoritative directives. To the extent authority binds and neither merely advises nor merely coerces, subjects must have reasons why they should not act on their private judgments. (shrink)

It was easier to make a revolution than to write 600 to 800 laws to create a market economy.Jiri Dienstbier, Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia (1990)[I]t would be as absurd to argue that the distribution of property must never be modified by law as it would be to argue that the distribution of political power must never bechanged.Morris Cohen (1927)The takings clause of the United States Constitution requires government to pay compensation when private property is taken for public use. When (...) government regulates, but does not physically seize, property, the Supreme Court of the United States has had trouble defining when individuals have been deprived of property rights so as to give them a right to compensation. The takings clause serves “to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens that, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” To determine when a regulation amounts to a “taking” of property requiring compensation, the Court has rightly stated that the ultimate question is whether the burden of regulation has been unfairly placed on a small class of individuals rather than the public at large. To answer this question, the Court has identified a variety of factors to consider, including the character of the governmental action, (whether the regulation effects a permanent physical invasion, destroys a core property right, or is intended to prevent public harm), whether the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the extent of the diminution in value of the property (particularly whether the regulation deprives the owner of any economically viable use of the property). (shrink)

I will say something on two or three related but distinct topics. First, something on the grounding of normative beliefs, a topic – as I see it – in moral epistemology, and then after a brief remark on explanation, something against a certain understanding of basic principles. My observations were prompted by reflection on Jerry’s desire to rescue justice from the facts.

_Jokes, Life after Death, and God _has two main tasks: to try to understand exactly what a joke is, and to see whether there are any connections between jokes, on the one hand, and life after death and God, on the other hand. But it pursues other tasks as well, tasks of an ancillary sort. This book devises a general and comprehensive, but brief, theory of jokes. The author begins with critiques of other writers’ views on the subject. 1) Ted (...) Cohen thinks that such a theory is impossible. 2) Ronald Berk, on the other hand, provides just such a theory. And 3) John Morreall provides a general theory of laughter, which may include some things which can be used in a general theory of jokes. 4) Neil Schaeffer, too, provides a general theory of laughter, which makes a big point out of what he calls the “ludicrous context”; but he does include a chapter on jokes. 5) Christopher Wilson offers a general theory of jokes in which he focuses on form and content. And 6) Thomas Werge, in reflecting on the comic, suggests a general theory of jokes which identifies their matter, form, agents, purposes, and beyond these, the underlying shared relational context, which makes it possible for jokes to arise. 7) Bill Fuller’s message is that there is more funniness coming out of two or more heads than out of one, just as Socrates’ message was that there is more clarity coming out of two or more heads than out of one. 8) Umberto Eco feels that monks should laugh, just as ordinary people do; for laughter not only refreshes our seeking spirits, it also illuminates the truth we seek. 9) Simon Critchley, in his reflections on humor, notes that jokes bring on a kind of everyday anamnesis, that they are anti-story stories, that they are like prayers, that they are like philosophy; and that they require a certain underlying context, which is implicitly recognized by both teller and listener, and which renders possible the tension needed to make the punch line work. 10) Martha Wolfenstein, pursuing a psychological analysis of children’s humor, proposes that the underlying motive for telling jokes remains the same from childhood to adulthood, i.e., to transform painful and frustrating experiences so as to extract pleasure from them; and that the agent or productive cause of jokes is the repressing unconscious, as suggested by Freud. As John Morreall has argued, neither the Superiority Theory, nor the Relief Theory, nor the Incongruity Theory appears to work as a general and comprehensive theory. Moreover, these writers talk more about humor and laughter than about jokes. To be sure, a joke is a type of humor. Thus, to say something about humor is to say something, though of a generic sort, about jokes. Similarly, to say something about the laughter caused by humor is to say something, though generic, about the laughter caused by jokes. Most of the authors considered in chapter one are concerned with jokes, and not only with humor as such. Section 11 of chapter one puts together, out of the combined contributions of these authors, what can be considered the beginnings of, some thoughts toward, a general and comprehensive theory of jokes. This task the author illustrates in a concrete way, by looking at individual jokes of different sorts; not, however, without inviting the reader to enjoy these jokes. The author looks particularly at Jewish jokes, Christian jokes, and Islamic jokes, jokes about philosophy and philosophers, yo mama jokes, Italian jokes and Slovak jokes, all of which makes for a clearer understanding of exactly what a joke is. The analysis of general theory is then followed by some views on the morality of jokes and joke-telling, and an analysis of the connection between jokes and life after death, on the one hand, and God, on the other. Throughout the book Bobik offers innumerable examples to heighten our understanding and entertain us. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ill HUME ON THE MORALITY OF PRINCES "There is a maxim very current in the world," says Hume (Treatise III, ii, sec. 11) "that there is a system of morals calculated for princes, much more free than that which ought to govern private persons. " He interprets the maxim to mean that "the morality of princes... has not the same force as that of private persons, and may lawfully (...) be transgress 'd from a more trivial motive." And he gives as an example: "we must necessarily give a greater indulgence to a prince or minister, who deceives another; than to a private gentleman, who breaks his word of honour" (T 569). This passage, cryptic though it is, makes Hume sound bad. He seems to be a cynic, or a skeptic, or an immoralist, with respect to the morality of nations. Does he think that princes have a special right to act immorally? Even worse is the reason he gives: international relations just don't matter very much, he says. And the chapter in question is not just a self-contained essay more or less tacked on to the Treatise. Hume tries to connect it integrally with his theory of justice. The point of the chapter is not to put forward a view about the morality of international relations (a view Hume himself admits may be found shocking), but to demonstrate the power of the theory of justice by showing how the "maxim current in the world" can be defended upon the theory's principles. The passage has not won approval from recent commentators. One, Marshall Cohen, labels Hume a "moderate skeptic" with regard to international morality and argues vehemently that Hume's position 2 should be condemned as immoral. Cohen, who thinks that there is only one system of morality and that it 112 applies "with equal force to princes and private persons," evidently thinks any system weakening ordinary standards is immoral by definition. He traces Hume's allegedly morally flawed views to what he regards as a deep flaw in Hume's moral theory, namely, his conventionalism. J. L. Mackie and Jonathan Harrison are both considerably more sympathetic to Hume's general position, but nevertheless are critical of the chapter in question. They agree with Hume's observation that international morality is weaker than private. (Harrison points out that people tend to regard breaches of private morality as more serious than breaches of international morality: "A minister may be dismissed for sexual misconduct, although he breaks solemn treaties with other nations with impunity." But, contrary to Hume, they find this weakness deplorable, Harrison arguing that, given the relative amount of harm princes do, the indulgence allowed them is irrational. Harrison in fact at first agrees with Hume: "He is right, too, in suggesting that the obligations of nations to be just in their dealings with one another is [sic] of less force than the obligations of private persons." But after ten pages he has evidently changed his mind: "[with respect to] what Hume says about the comparative force of the morality of princes and the morality of private persons, though it is clear that there is nothing in principle wrong with Hume's view that the former has less force than the latter... it is doubtful whether he is right in saying that the former do in fact have less force than the latter." Like Cohen, who holds that "Injustice among nations should be regarded as being as reprehensible as injustice among individuals," Harrison concludes (more tentatively than Cohen) "my 113 own feeling... is that though Hume is right in thinking that the morality of princes is commonly regarded as being of less force than private morality, he is wrong... in thinking that... they [sic] are of less force." So none of our commentators agree with Hume that international morality not only is, but is properly, weaker than domestic. How did Hume go wrong? Hume argues that international morality is weaker because the interests at stake are less. Where the interests at stake do not matter very much, Hume thinks, it is not so important what people do, and thus the moral obligations involved are weaker. (Hume thinks this idea... (shrink)

International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Volume 20, Issue 3, Page 315-317, July 2012.

Some eighty years after Husserl’s The Crisis of the European Sciences, yet another crisis looms over Europe. However, this haunting crisis – and one could here question the value of the word ‘crisi...

The following essay seeks to deploy, from Husserl to Levinas, the centrality of the problem of temporality. In truth, the understanding of temporality constitutes, properly said, that which identifies and differentiates all the authors of the phenomenological tradition. Which means: temporality is that from which all phenomenological breakthroughs are signified and given their very possibility. Our task is thus, through a reading of Husserl, Heidegger and Levinas, to reveal how temporality is reassessed in the history of phenomenology as well as (...) to show how the philosophy of E. Levinas opens, beyond Husserl and Heidegger but by rendering justice to them both, to a novel and unedited temporality: an irreducible temporality of alterity from whence 'presence' is suspended by another source of meaning than the intentional constitution of phenomenality. (shrink)